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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 20020974-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions in three consolidated cases of three counts of burglary, 
all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 2002); two 
counts of theft, a second and third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1999); and one count of receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41 -1 a-1316 (1998) (all contained in Addendum A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1 .A. Did the trial court properly determine that the first of three disposition requests 
filed by defendant triggered the running of the 120-day disposition period under Utah's 
speedy trial statute? 
LB. Did the trial court properly determine that "good cause" existed to extend the 
disposition period beyond the August 14 and 15 trials by attributing to defendant 
responsibility for ten days during which defendant filed a motion to dismiss for an alleged 
violation of his statutory speedy trial rights, the court held an evidentiary hearing, and the 
judge determined which of three possible disposition periods applied to this matter? 
2. Did the prosecutor make the requisite good faith effort to comply with the speedy 
trial statute where he appropriately brought the matters to trial within the disposition period 
triggered by defendant's third disposition request, which was the only request the pros knew 
of until two weeks before the trials? 
The trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute under the 
detainer statute is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Peterson, 2002 UT App 
53, f 5,42 P.3d 1258; State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, Uf 3-4,34 P.3d 790, cert denied, 
42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002). This Court reviews the underlying legal conclusions for 
correctness and the factual findings for clear error. See Peterson, 2002 UT App 53, [^5; 
Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ff 3-4. The attribution of delay to a party is a factual finding, 
reviewed for clear error. See Coleman, 2001 UT App 281,14, n.4; State v. Pathammavong, 
2 
860 P.2d 1001,1004 (Utah App. 1993). The determination of the existence of "good cause" 
under the speedy trial statute is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d911, 915 (Utah 1998). 
Matters of statutory interpretation present questions of law which are reviewed for 
correctness without deference to the trial court's interpretation. See State v. Lindsay, 2000 
UTApp379,f 9,18 P.3d 504 (quoting Statev.Harley, 1999 UT App 197,1fif 9-10,982 P.2d 
1145, cert denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999)); State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 
1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), is relevant to the issues presented on appeal and 
is contained in its entirety in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Because the chronology of the proceedings in this matter is critical in applying Utah's 
statute on speedy trial rights, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), the relevant dates and 
corresponding undisputed facts are presented as follows1: 
Jan. 14,2002 The first of two home burglaries occurred (R. 175- presentence 
investigation report [PSI] at 2).2 
1A 2002 calendar is included in Addendum C for the reader's convenience. 
2The record is comprised, in part, of three pleadings files—one for each of the 
three cases from which this appeal arises. Most of the relevant documents are the same in 
each file, necessitating only a single citation to the first of the three cases. Consequently, 
citations to the record in the first case (Case No. 021200163FS) will be simply to "R." at 
the relevant page number. Where a citation must be made to the other two pleadings, the 
3 
Feb. 26, 2002 A stolen vehicle report was filed with the police (id. at 3). 
Mar. 7,2002 An information was filed charging defendant with one count of 
burglary and one count of theft based on the January 14 events 
(R. 2-3). 
Mar. 11,2002 The second home burglary occurred (R-271. at 3-6). Defendant 
wrecked the car reported stolen on Feb. 26 and fled, leaving in 
it items taken in the second burglary (id.). He fled on foot, 
broke into a house, and, after several hours, surrendered to 
police (id. and State's Exh. 20; R-272. at 6-8). 
Mar. 15,2002 A second information was filed, charging defendant with 
receiving a stolen vehicle, possession of a firearm by a felon, 
and burglary (R-271. at 3-5) 
Mar. 21,2002 A third information was filed, charging defendant with one 
count of burglary and three counts of theft (R-272. at 6-16). 
Mar. 24, 2002 Defendant executed his first disposition request (Defendant's 
Exh. #2). 
Apr. 1,2002 Kimberly Clark (LDA) entered her appearance as counsel for 
defendant and submitted a formal discovery request (R-271. at 
11; R-272. at 21-24). 
Apr. 3,2002 At roll call, defense counsel requested a continuance to transfer 
to Murray defendant's two Salt Lake cases, for which counsel 
was also responsible (R. 176: #1 at 1-2).3 The continuance was 
granted until May 1 (R. 26-28; R. 176: #1 at 2). The prosecutor 
did not object to the continuance or the transfer (R. 27; R. 176: 
#1 at 1-2; State's Exh. 5). 
State will indicate the pleading by the last three digits of the case number, i.e., "(R-271. at 
)" for Case No. 021200271FS, or "(R-272. at )" for Case No. 021200272FS. 
3Two of the transcripts contain multiple hearings separated by numbered index 
tabs. Citation to such a transcript will be to the number stamped on the front, bottom, 
right-hand comer, then the index number in the volume, then the page number of the 
relevant information, e.g., (R. 177: #index at pages). 
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Apr. 9,2002 The prison date-stamped defendant's first disposition request as 
received by prison authorities (Defendant's Exh. 2). The prison 
rejected this request for internal policy reasons (R. 150). 
Apr. 19,2002 The prison date-stamped defendant's second disposition request 
(R. 151). The prison rejected this request for the same reason as 
the last one (id.). 
May 1, 2002 The parties appeared and set a preliminary hearing on all three 
cases for June 26, and a scheduling conference for July 2 (R. 30-
34; R-271. at 18-20; R-272. at 28-30). 
May 9, 2002 Defendant completed a third disposition request (R. 151). 
May 17, 2002 The prison date-stamped the third request as received (State's 
Exh. # 1). 
June 5,2002 The District Attorney received the only disposition request sent 
to him from the prison—defendant's third request (R. 151). The 
cover memorandum advised the prosecutor that the demand date 
for the disposition request was May 17, making the expiration 
date September 13th, 2002 (State's Exh. # 1) (in Addendum D). 
June 26, 2002 A preliminary hearing was held on all three cases, and a 
scheduling conference was set for July 2 (R. 44-45; R-271. at 
21-25; R-272. at 32-34). 
July 2, 2002 A scheduling conference was held to set trial dates, during 
which it was decided that the matters would be tried in two 
consecutive trials (R. 177: #2 at 2-4). Defense counsel was 
unavailable from July 31 through the first week of August, 
leaving August 14 and 15 as the court's next available dates for 
trial (R. 177: #2 at 1-4). The pre-trial conference was set for 
July 30 (R. 47-50; R-271. at 27-30; R-272. at 35-38). 
July 30, 2002 At the pre-trial conference for all three cases, new defense 
counsel informed the court for the first time that multiple 
disposition requests were filed, voiced his intent to file a motion 
to dismiss based on an alleged violation of his statutory speedy 
trial right, and was granted an evidentiary hearing on August 9 
(R. 52-55). 
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Aug. 2, 2002 Defendant filed his motion to dismiss all three cases (R. 56-77; 
R-271. at 32-53). 
Aug. 6, 2002 The last day of the 120-day detainer period which began with 
the prison's receipt of defendant's first disposition request. 
Aug. 8, 2002 The State's response to defendant's motion as filed (R-272. at 
54-87). 
Aug. 9, 2002 An evidentiary hearing was held on defendant's motion, after 
which the court denied the motion to dismiss (R. 86; R-271. at 
88-89; R-272. at 41-42). 
Aug. 14-15, 2002 The State moved to consolidate two of the cases because the 
counts all arose from a single criminal episode (R-271. at 128-
29; R-272. at 43-44). Two jury trials were held back-to-back, 
and defendant was convicted as charged (R. 89-90, 133-36; R-
271. at 128-29, 175-76). On the charges arising from the first 
home burglary, defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms 
of one-to-fifteen years for the burglary and zero-to-five years for 
the theft (R. 145-46). 
Oct. 24,2002 The trial court entered written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and an Order denying defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 
148-55) (attached in Addendum E). On the consolidated case 
convictions, defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of 
one-to-fifteen years for each of the two burglary counts, for the 
theft count, and for the receiving a stolen motor vehicle count, 
with the sentences to run concurrently to each other but 
consecutively with the sentences in the first case (R-271. at 178-
80). 
Nov. 14,2002 Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal for all cases (R-271. at 
190-192). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The particular facts of defendant's crimes are not relevant to determination of the 
issues on appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion 
to dismiss the charges against him based on an alleged violation of his statutory speedy trial 
rights. Once an incarcerated defendant has properly delivered a written request for 
disposition of charges to custodial authorities at the prison, the prosecutor must bring 
defendant to trial within 120 days or suffer dismissal of the charges identified in the 
disposition request. The time period may be tolled or temporarily waived by defendant or 
extended for "good cause" as determined by the trial court. 
In this case, the prison rejected defendant's first two disposition requests and returned 
them to defendant pursuant to an internal policy that resulted in a decision that defendant had 
too little money in his prison account to pay for mailing his notice, and too much to qualify 
as indigent for the court to do the mailing. The prison forwarded only defendant's third 
disposition request to the court and the prosecutor. The trial court properly determined that 
the prison's policy conflicted with the plain language of the speedy trial statute and held that 
the 120-day disposition period under the statute commenced upon the prison's receipt of 
defendant's/?^/ disposition request. 
The trial court then properly attributed ten days of delay to defendant for the time 
involved in considering, taking evidence, and ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss for 
an alleged violation of the speedy trial statute. The judge reasoned that it was not possible 
to know which of three possible disposition periods applied to this case and when that period 
ended. The direct result of defendant's motion was to prevent the prosecutor from meeting 
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his statutory obligation under the appropriate disposition period of which he knew nothing, 
despite the fact that he fully complied with his statutory obligation under the period he 
believed to be relevant. 
This Court may also affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss 
on one of two alternative bases. First, and most direct, is the fact that the August 14 and 15 
trial dates were unknowingly set less than ten days beyond the appropriate disposition period 
solely because of defense counsel's schedule. Counsel was unavailable for the July 31 date 
offered by the trial court, and the court's next available date was August 14. Extending the 
disposition period beyond 120 days because of defense counsel's schedule constitutes good 
cause for tolling the disposition period. 
Second, defendant's sought and received a twenty-eight day delay in the proceedings 
after he filled out his first disposition request, but before delivering it to the prison 
authorities. Eighteen days of that delay occurred after commencement of the 120-day period 
under that disposition request. As defense counsel admitted that the request was solely for 
her convenience in representing defendant in multiple criminal matters, the delay tolled the 
disposition period and rendered the August 14 and 15 trial dates timely. 
POINT II: Dismissal of the charges is not appropriate because of the prosecutor's 
inability to schedule the trials before the end of the disposition period triggered by 
defendant's first disposition request. As of July 2, the court calendar had room for the trials 
only on July 31 and August 14. The August 14 setting was finalized because defense counsel 
was unavailable on July 31. The August 14 date met the prosecutor's statutory obligations 
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under the third disposition request—which was the only disposition request known to the 
prosecutor. It was not until July 30 that defendant explained the existence of multiple 
disposition requests to the court and the prosecutor—two weeks before the trial dates and one 
week before the end of the disposition period triggered by defendant's/zrsf request. Given 
that a single timely trial date appeared on the court's calendar when the trials were set 
twenty-eight days earlier, it is highly unlikely that the court could schedule a timely trial after 
ruling on defendant's motion. Further, the disposition period was necessarily tolled pending 
the outcome of defendant's motion and hearing because of the confusion surrounding the 
appropriate beginning and ending of the applicable disposition period. Hence, the 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS BECAUSE "GOOD CAUSE" EXISTED TO EXTEND 
THE 120-DAY PERIOD BASED ON DELAY ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
DEFENDANT 
A. Introduction 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss, arguing that the 
trial court misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), Utah's intrastate speedy trial 
statute. This provision, which outlines defendant's statutory speedy trial right, provides: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
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pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, 
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court . . . may be granted any reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or 
within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel 
moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court 
finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard 
within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous 
motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter 
dismissed with prejudice. 
(Emphasis added). Add. B. The purpose ofsection 77-29-1 is "to protect the constitutional 
right of prisoners to a speedy trial and to prevent those charged with enforcement of criminal 
statutes from holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed charges against him." State v. 
Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403, 404-05 (Utah 1982) (citing purpose of predecessor statute); accord 
State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175,1176 (Utah 1985) (citing purpose ofsection 77-29-1 in similar 
terms); see also State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 362, 453 P.2d 158, 159 (1969) (citing 
purpose of predecessor statute). 
The statute outlines the responsibilities of both parties in bringing about a speedy 
resolution of charges. While the prosecution carries the ultimate burden of bringing the 
10 
matter to trial within 120 days of the filing of a disposition request, defendant has the 
threshold burden of ensuring that the statute is properly invoked. See State v. Heaton, 958 
P.2d 911, 915-16 (Utah 1998) (when a prisoner delivers a written notice pursuant to the 
statute, then the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the matter heard in 120 days; 120 
days does not start until notice is properly delivered under the statute); State v. Petersen, 810 
P.2d 421,424 (Utah 1991) (describing the prosecutor's burden); State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 
447, 450-51 (Utah 1987) (the request must be appropriately sent to the right people and 
contain an appropriate demand in order to be effective); Viles, 702 P.2d at 1175 (the burden 
is on the prisoner to give proper notice before being entitled to have charges disposed of in 
the statutory period); Wilson, 453 P.2d at 160 (describing the prosecutor's burden). Once a 
defendant has properly invoked the statute to start the 120-day period running, thereby 
shifting the burden to the prosecution to ensure a timely trial, defendant must not unduly 
delay matters or the delay may be charged against him and the 120-day period extended. See 
/featoAi,958P.2dat916. 
Defendant claims that each of the bases upon which the trial court relied to extend the 
120-day disposition period is invalid. First, he argues that the filing of his motion to dismiss 
did not toll the running of the time period, as the trial court held, because it did not delay the 
trials, which had already been set and which thereafter were heard as scheduled. Br. of Aplt. 
at 8-9,17-18. He also argues that the trial court erroneously penalized him for filing multiple 
disposition requests when it was the prison's internal administrative policy that caused the 
multiple filings and the delay in the prosecutor's discovery of the existence of the first 
11 
disposition request. Id. at 9-17. Consequently, he contends, there was no good cause 
justifying the failure to try him before expiration of the proper 120-day period on August 6, 
2002.4 Id. at 25. 
B. Trial Court's Ruling 
Defendant first informed the trial court at the pretrial conference on July 30,2002, that 
multiple disposition requests existed, and that he intended to file a motion to dismiss the 
charges because of the State's alleged failure to comply with the speedy trial statute by trying 
him within 120 days of the prison's receipt of his first disposition request (R. 152). Add. E. 
He requested and was given an evidentiary hearing on August 9 (R. 152-53). Add. E. He 
filed his motion and supporting memorandum on August 2. After argument by the parties 
at the August hearing and again at a hearing on October 16,5 the trial court entered the 
following relevant findings: 
9. On April 9,2002,... the defendant delivered to a custodial officer 
in authority . . . a "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges." 
This demand was rejected due to the Utah State Prison's internal indigency 
policy regarding mailing costs. Excluding the delivery date of April 9,2002, 
4Although defendant mentions his constitutional right to a speedy trial, his 
arguments below and on appeal pertain solely to his state statutory right (R.56-62; R. 177: 
#4 at 1-31). Br. of Aplt. at 3, 6, 10. Accordingly, this Court need only address the 
statutory right. See, e.g., State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 39 n.l (Utah 1996), abrogated on 
other grounds by State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 
1108, 1111 n.4 (Utah 1989). 
5The October hearing involved not only sentencing, but a detailed discussion 
between the court and the parties on tolling under the speedy trial statute (R. 177: #5 at 1-
23). 
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the time period for bringing the defendant to trial would have been August 6, 
2002, on the Defendant's first request. 
10. On April 19, 2002, the defendant d[e]livered a second [request, 
which].. .was again denied per the Prison's . . . policy [T]he time period 
for bringing the Defendant to trial on the Defendant's second request would 
have been August 16, 2002. 
12. The Defendant filed a third request . . . and such request was 
received by an authorized agent on May 17,2002. The May 17,2002 request 
for disposition was the first request that was forwarded to the Salt Lake 
County District Attorney's Office by the Utah State Prison. The time period 
for prosecution of pending charges pursuant to the delivered demand is 
September 13,2002. 
(R. 150-52). Add. E. The court also entered the following relevant conclusions: 
1. The Utah State Prison does not have the legal authority to reject a 
sufficiently completed Request for Disposition of Pending Charges delivered 
to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent 
of the same and is required to immediately cause the demand to be forwarded 
by personal delivered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the 
appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. 
3. The Court concludes the appropriate demand date for written 
Request for Disposition of Pending Charges is April 9,2002, and that pending 
charges against the defendant should have been brought to trial 120 days after 
that date, or by August 6,2002, subject to good cause shown by the prosecutor 
as to why the matter was not heard by August 6,2002, or subject to any delay 
that is to be attributed to the Defendant. 
4. The Court finds that the 120 day time period was tolled from July 
30,2002, to August 9,2002, because the Defendant filed a Motion To Dismiss 
and requested a hearing on such Motion. 
5. The Court finds that good cause exists to extend the time within 
which to allow the State of Utah to prosecute this matter beyond August 6, 
13 
2002, because the Defendant's subsequent filings of 120 day dispositions 
caused confusion about the time period within which the Defendant was to be 
tried. 
6. The defendant filed requests for disposition of charges on April 9, 
2002, April 19, 2002, and on May 17, 2002, with the appropriate authorized 
agents of the Utah State Prison: [the last one was the only one] processed by 
the Utah State Prison and delivered to the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
and to the Court of the Clerk [sic]; 
7. The Salt Lake County Attorney's Office has always relied on a 
demand date of May 17,2002 [the third disposition request], and the trial date 
of August 14,2002, is within the 120 day time frame from the only Notice and 
Request for Disposition of Pending Charge* orocessed by the Prison. 
(R. 153-54). Add. E. The judge then denied defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 154). Add. 
C. Applicable Law 
"[W]hether the district court properly denied [a defendant's] motion to dismiss 
pursuant to the detainer [or speedy trial] statute requires a two-step inquiry." State v. 
Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146,18,473 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (quotation and emphasis omitted, 
alterations in original). "First, we must determine when the 120 day period commenced and 
when it expired. Second, if the trial was held beyond the 120 day period, we must then 
determine whether 'good cause' excused the delay." Id. (quoting State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT 
App 379, f 9,18 P.3d 504 (additional citation omitted)). If no good cause excused the delay, 
then the "court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice." Wagenman, 2002 UT App 
146,19 (quoting Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1 (4)); see also Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916-917 (noting 
that good cause excuses non-compliance with the statute). 
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In this case, the trial court ultimately relied on the prison's receipt of the first 
disposition notice on April 19, 2002, in concluding that the 120-day period commenced on 
April 20, 2002 (R. 153). Add. D. See State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, f 6 n.7, 34 P.3d 
790 (the 120 day period commences the day after the Utah State Prison stamp[s] Defendant's 
notice 'received.') (quotation omitted), cert denied, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002). Defendant 
does not challenge this finding. Accepting this date, for purposes of argument, an 
uninterrupted 120-day period would expire on August 6,2002 (R. 153). Add. C and E. Br. 
of Aplt. at 9 n.9, & 11 n. 10. The trials occurred on August 14 and 15—eight and nine days 
beyond the end of the 120-day period. Hence, the question becomes whether "good cause" 
existed to toll the running of the 120-days beyond August 6.6 See Wagenman, 2003 UT App 
146,f8. 
"Good cause" means: "(1) delay caused by the defendant—such as asking for a 
continuance; or (2) 'a relatively short delay caused by unforseen problems arising 
immediately prior to trial.'" Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, f 6 (quoting Petersen, 810 P.2d 
at 426 (footnote omitted)); see also Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916 ("when a prisoner himself acts 
to delay the trial, he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive his right to a speedy 
trial"); State v. Banner, 1X1 P.2d 1325, 1329-30 (Utah 1986) (defendant's delay of a trial 
constitutes a temporary waiver of his statutory right to a speedy trial); State v. Velasquez, 641 
6The third disposition request, which was the only one received by the court and 
the prosecutor, was received by the prison on May 17, 2002 (State's Exh. 1). Add. D. An 
uninterrupted disposition period of 120 days for this request would expire on September 
13, 2002 (R. 153-54). Add. C & E. 
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P.2d 115,116 (Utah 1982) (providing the same with respect to the 90-day disposition period 
under the former statute); accord State v. Pathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1004-05 (Utah 
App. 1993). In this case, the trial court properly found that "good cause" arose in two 
different ways, either of which extended the 120-day period beyond the August 14 and 15 
trial dates. However, a more direct path to affirming the trial court may be found in either 
of two alternative grounds not contained in the trial court's ruling. 
D. This Court Should Affirm The Trial Court's Ruling Because Setting The 
Trials Less Than Ten Days Beyond The End Of The Disposition Period 
Was Justified Because Of Defense Counsel's Schedule 
This Court may affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss based 
on a point not ruled on by the trial court: the trial dates were originally set beyond August 
6 in order to accommodate defense counsel's schedule. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916 (Utah 
1998) ("this court may affirm a trial court's decision on any reasonable legal basis, provided 
that any rationale for affirmance finds support in the record."); Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, 
K14,n.9. 
At the hearing on July 2, the parties and the court discussed available trial dates. The 
judge asked the parties what his "outside date" was on the disposition period (R. 177: #2 at 
1). Defense counsel stated, "I'm not sure." (Id.) The prosecutor provided the only date he 
had before him: September 13 (id.). The judge then asked, "So we need to do it before 
September the 13th?" (Id.). Defense counsel's response was, "Right." (Id.) 
The judge went on to explain that the only dates available on the court's calendar 
before September 13 were July 31 and August 14 (R. 177: #2 at 2). Defense counsel was 
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scheduled to conduct an in-custody trial on July 31 and August 1, making her unavailable for 
trial on this case (R. 177: #2 at 1-2). Defense counsel also had an in-custody homicide trial 
before another judge the first week of August (R. 177: #2 at 1). She offered to free herself 
for this case the week after the homicide trial, but made no offer of availability for an earlier 
date (R. 177: #2 at 1-2). The prosecutor did not discuss his schedule at all, but agreed with 
the ultimate date set between the judge and defense counsel (id.). 
Because defense counsel was unavailable on the only date within the disposition 
period that the Court could timely schedule the trial in this case, the judge properly 
proceeded to the next available date on the court's calendar at which defense counsel could 
appear. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 ("extending the trial date to a reasonable time outside 
the disposition period to accommodate, in part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes 'good 
cause' under section 77-29-1(3) and (4)"); State v. Bonny, All P.2d 147, 148 (Utah 1970) 
(setting the trial outside the statutory period to accommodate defense counsel's schedule was 
"entirely reasonable and practical").7 
E. Alternatively. Good Cause Existed To Extend The 120-Dav Period Bv Eighteen 
Days Based On Defendant's Receipt Of A Continuance 
A second alternative basis exists upon which this Court may affirm the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant is obligated under the statute to avoid 
causing delay during the proceedings, as such delays will be seen as a temporary waiver of 
7This alternative basis renders the remainder of defendant's appeal meritless 
because it fully supports the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss and the setting of the 
trials less than ten days past the conclusion of the appropriate disposition period. 
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the defendant's statutory speedy trial right. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916 (when a defendant 
causes delay of a trial, "he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive his right to a speedy 
trial" and the period is extended by the length of the delay attributable to defendant). 
Further, it is defendant's triggering of the statute that gives rise to the prosecutor's 
obligations under the statute. See id. at 915 (noting that it is the language of the statute that 
places the burden of complying with the statute on the prosecution"). 
In this case, defendant unilaterally caused a delay that overlapped with the filing of 
his first disposition request. At roll call on April 3—ten days after completing his first 
disposition request but before that request was received by prison authorities—defendant 
requested and received a continuance in order to transfer his two Salt Lake cases to the 
Murray courts so that his counsel could more conveniently represent defendant in all of them 
(R. 176: #1 at 1-2). The following exchange occurred at the roll call: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, two things. [Defendant] has new cases 
in Salt Lake I would like to have transferred here because they both are 
assigned to me also. It would be most convenient if you would accept them 
and I can get the other judges to transfer them here, plus he's in [inaudible]. 
THE COURT: So transfer those here rather than his there? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Because I have to go along with a sentenced -
mostly for my selfish reasons. 
THE COURT: How soon do you want them here? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, we should probably [inaudible] two weeks. 
I think I can get the [inaudible]. 
THE COURT: Well, the next date I actually have at all is May 1st. 
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [inaudible]. 
THE COURT: May 1st? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That should give me -
THE COURT: Is that all right with you Mr. Hankerson? 
DEFENDANT: That's fine with me, sir. 
(Id.). 
That continuance lasted from April 3 until May 1—a total of twenty-eight days, 
during which nothing could be done to move the cases forward. Defendant's first disposition 
request was stamped as received by the prison on April 9. Consequently, eighteen of the 
twenty-eight days in the defense delay occurred after the April 9 triggering of defendant's 
statutory period. Under the inflexible doctrine of vertical stare decisis, this Court must 
follow the Utah Supreme Court case law holding that delays caused by defendant act to toll 
the running of the statutory disposition period and justify extension of the period for the 
length of the delays. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (comparing 
vertical and horizontal stare decisis), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995); see also Heaton, 
958 P.2d at 916-17 ("[W]e hold that. . . extending the trial date to a reasonable time outside 
the disposition period to accommodate in part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes 'good 
cause' under section 77-29-1(3) and (4) and the trial court correctly denied Heaton's motion 
to dismiss."); Banner, 111 P.2dat 1329-30; Velasquez, 641 P.2dat 116; see also Wagenman, 
2003 UT App 146, f 10; State v. Peterson, 2002 UT App 53, f 8, 42 P.3d 1258; State v. 
Pathammavong, 860 P.2d at 1004 ("[T]he defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated 
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because he had requested continuances — We conclude, therefore, that these continuances 
were reasonable and based upon good cause — " ) ; State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319, 1321-
22 (Utah App), cert denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). In other words, the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to dismiss should be affirmed because defendant's delay tolled 
the 120-day period for eighteen days, bringing the August 14 and 15 trials within the 
statutory period. See, e.g., Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916-17. This is especially true where the 
delay commenced prior to the triggering of the speedy trial statute, at a time when the 
prosecution had no obligation under the statute. See Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, f 7 (it is 
only once a prisoner "appropriately requests speedy resolution of pending charges" under the 
statute, that the State acquires the burden "to commence trial within the 120-day period" of 
the statute); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (a prisoner is not entitled to speedy 
resolution of pending charges until he is incarcerated, an untried information is pending, and 
he successfully delivers his disposition request to prison authorities). But see Coleman, 2001 
UT App 281, at ffl[ 5, 14 (holding that where the prosecutor fails to object to the delay or 
otherwise bring the speedy trial issue to the court's attention, even before the statute is 
triggered, the delay will not toll the running of the time period). 
F. Delay Identified Bv The Trial Court As Attributable To Defendant 
Extended The Time Period To Include The Trials 
1. The trial court properiv identified the commencement of the statutory 
period. 
The trial court held that the prison "does not have the legal authority to reject a 
sufficiently completed Request for Disposition of Pending Charges" that is duly delivered 
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to the appropriate authority (R. 153). Add. E. Instead, the prison "is required to immediately 
cause the demand to be forwarded by personally] delivered or certified mail, return receipt 
requested, to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk." (Id.). The court's ruling 
comports with the plain language of the statute: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner . . . shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial 
officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand 
specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and 
requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the 
charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written 
notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (emphasis added). Add. B. 
Moreover, where the prison authority acts to unreasonably delay the request beyond 
a reasonable time or fails to complete the required documentation or to properly address the 
document, relief may be available to defendant under the statute. See State v. Taylor, 538 
P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1975). Consequently, the trial court properly commenced the 120-day 
period from the prison's receipt of the first disposition request on April 9, 2002, instead of 
from the third request. 
2. The trial court properly attributed ten days of delay to defendant for 
his motion to dismiss, bringing the August trial dates within the 120-day 
period. 
The trial court also held that "the 120 day time period was tolled from July 30,2002, 
to August 9,2002, because the Defendant filed a Motion To Dismiss and requested a hearing 
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on such motion." (R. 153). Add. E. Generally, delay attributable to defendant—including 
that caused by the filing of a motion to dismiss for a statutory speedy trial violation—tolls 
the running of the 120-day period. See Peterson, 2002 UT App. 53, f 8; see also Heaton, 
958 P.2d at 916; Banner, 1X1 P.2d at 1329-30. 
Defendant argues that his motion and hearing did not cause delay because the 
previously-set trial went on as scheduled after the hearing occurred. Br. of Aplt. at 17-18. 
Defendant made this same point to the trial court, but his appellate analysis omits the trial 
court's valid explanation as to why the motion and hearing caused delay under the unique 
circumstances of this case. 
At the sentencing hearing October 16,2002, the trial court initiated a discussion with 
counsel concerning parts of the disposition period which may or may not have been tolled 
(R. 177:#5 at 1-23). When the discussion reached the issue of defendant's motion to dismiss, 
the trial court explained his reasoning for tolling the period between defendant's July 30 
declaration that he intended to file the motion and the August 9 hearing: 
. . . In this case the issue was raised before the 120 days had passed, that we 
had set a trial beyond the 120 days. And — and so the timing was, I filed my 
motion — I meaning of course Mr. Heineman — files the motion on July 30th. 
Well, to accommodate the hearing, to make the determination that the date had 
been miscalculated, we put the hearing on the 9th of August, which happens to 
be the 120th — the real 120th day.[8] Now that — and so I think what I'm 
going to determine here is — as I say I've already — already found the good 
cause aspect of it. And I confirm that, if you will. But in terms of period of 
time to — to also — that are tolled, I find that the period of time between July 
8As recognized in the court's written findings and conclusions, the true ending date 
was August 6 (R. 153-54). Add. E. 
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30th and August the 9th is tolled for a 120 day calculation. And the reason that 
is is because the defendant made a motion to dismiss and a request for a 
hearing on the motion, and to accommodate everybody's schedule to be able 
to hear that motion, and I think the situation here is the motion itself would 
identify August the 9th as the 120th day, or at least sometime prior to August 
14th was the 120th day. So we set the motion for hearing only to determine that 
the day that we're having this hearing is the 120th day. So I think — I think 
given that circumstance, that it is appropriate that the period of time between 
the filing of the motion, August the 30th — or July 30th, 2002, and August the 
9th, 2002, are tolled for calculating the 120 days. 
(R. 177:#5 at 18-19). When the parties explained that the motion was not filed until August 
2, the trial court verified that the hearing was set on July 30, then explained further: 
Oh. Well I think July 30th then is — because that's [August 2] when the actual 
motion may have been filed, but the — the issue was raised, if you will, and 
the scheduling was accommodated on July 30th. So I think July 30th is the — 
and I guess that's why I was thinking July 30th. I'm going to find that that 
period of time is tolled. 
{Id. at 20). 
While defendant is correct in noting that neither his motion nor the hearing changed 
the trial dates which had previously been set, he ignores the fact that both the motion and the 
hearing caused delay in everyone's ability to appropriately proceed because the motion 
suggested that the 120-day period followed up to that point was wrong, while it was not until 
the hearing that the proper date could be determined so that the parties could act accordingly. 
Given the unusual circumstances of this case, the trial court's rationale supports the 
tolling of the time during which the motion was contemplated, heard, and ruled on. 
Defendant's July 30 declaration of his intent to file the motion was the first time the 
prosecutor or the court knew not only that there were not only other disposition notices in 
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existence, but that they pre-dated the one under which both the court and the prosecutor had 
been acting. As the transcript of the July 30 hearing reveals, everyone was uncertain as to 
the actual dates of commencement and conclusion of the 120-day period associated with the 
first disposition request. In recognition of the fact that September 13 was unlikely to remain 
a valid ending date for the appropriate 120-day period, but that no final date could be 
determined until consideration of defendant's motion and evidence, the court set the earliest 
possible hearing date. 
Because defendant's July 30 representations first brought the issue to light, and the 
appropriate time period could not be determined until after an evidentiary hearing on 
defendant's motion, the trial court properly held that the disposition period was tolled until 
after the August 9 evidentiary hearing. 
3, The trial court noted the confusion caused bv the existence of multiple 
disposition requests and properly attributed that delay to defendant 
thereby extending the 120-dav period to encompass the trials 
The trial court ruled that good cause existed to extend the 120-day period because 
Defendant's multiple disposition requests "caused confusion about the time period within 
which the Defendant was to [be] tried." (R. 153-54). Add. E. Defendant claims that the 
prison, not himself, caused the confusion and that he should not suffer because of the prison's 
internal policy. Br. of Aplt. at 18-25. He claims that his obligation under the statute is 
simply to execute and deliver a disposition request to the proper authority, and that anything 
else that may or may not occur falls on the shoulders of the prison and the prosecutor. Id. 
at 22. 
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Defendant presents an interesting argument—rejected by the trial court—that fails to 
acknowledge that defendant did more in this case than simply meet his obligation to submit 
a disposition request to the proper authorities, does not admit his part in the creation of the 
confusion, and does not address his role in the exacerbation of the confusion. However, 
given the number of other bases on which to decide the case, this Court need not reach 
defendant's argument. See arguments in Point I, supra. See, e.g., State v. Harrison, 2001 
UT 33, f 40,24 P.3d 936 (need not reach all claims where one is dispositive of the appeal). 
POINT II 
BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR MADE THE REQUISITE "GOOD 
FAITH EFFORT TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTE" UNDER THE 
FACTS AS HE KNEW THEM, AND DEFENDANT DID NOT 
CORRECT THE MISPERCEPTION UNTIL ONE WEEK BEFORE 
EXPIRATION OF THE 120-DAY PERIOD, DISMISSAL WAS NOT 
WARRANTED 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor did not do enough to have his charges tried 
within the deadline which followed from his first disposition request and that the failure 
warrants the ultimate sanction of dismissal pursuant to the speedy trial statute. Br. of Aplt. 
at 25-28. Specifically, he argues that by the time the prosecutor discovered on July 30 that 
the 120-day period expired August 6 instead of September 13, he could have done more to 
have the trial moved ahead a week. Id. The record does not support defendant's argument. 
The prosecutor bears the burden under the speedy trial statute for making "a good 
faith effort" to have the charges tried within the 120-day period or any justified extension 
thereof. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915; see also Petersen, 810 P.2d at 423-24. It is undisputed 
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that the prosecutor was provided with only the third disposition request, pursuant to which 
the 120-day period would expire on September 13 (R. 151, 154).9 It is also undisputed that 
the prosecutor arranged to have the trials scheduled within the 120-day period as dictated by 
the disposition request he possessed (State's Exh. 1). Br. of Aplt. at 11, n. 10. Hence, under 
normal circumstances, the prosecutor expended the necessary "good faith effort" to satisfy 
his obligation under the speedy trial statute. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915. 
However, as stated, neither the prosecutor nor the trial court in this case knew that 
the 120-day period started before defendant's submission of the disposition request 
ultimately sent to the prosecutor. Only defendant knew that he had served two previous 
disposition requests on the prison, and he failed to divulge this information until the pre-trial 
conference on July 30. At that point, the trial dates of August 14 and 15 had been set for 
several weeks, only seven days remained in the "true" 120-day period (assuming no "good 
cause" existed to extend it), and defendant's hearing on his motion to dismiss could not be 
heard until three days after expiration of that period. 
9The trial court's conclusions of law states, "The defendant filed requests for 
disposition of charges on April 9, 2002, April 19, 2002, and on May 17, 2002, with the 
appropriate authorized agents of the Utah State Prison: processed [sic] by the Utah State 
Prison and delivered to the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office and to the Court of the 
Clerk" (R. 154). Add. E. Clearly a clause is missing at the beginning of the second part 
of this sentence. Because the third disposition request is the only request that was 
"processed" by the prison instead of being rejected and returned to defendant, the court 
necessarily meant to refer to the third request when noting that the request processed by 
the prison was delivered to the prosecutor and the court. 
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Defendant claims that "there was still time to move up the trials to make the August 
6th deadline." Br. of Aplt. at 26. However, as the trial court explained, the August 9 hearing 
was necessary to determine the beginning of the 120-day period. Nothing could be done 
until they knew where they stood. Consequently, everything was tolled pending the outcome 
of the motion and hearing. See Point IF2 supra. 
Further, nothing in the record supports defendant's bald, self-serving claim that there 
was likely to be any room on the court's calendar between July 31 and August 6 to squeeze 
a two-day setting into the calendar. Nothing suggests that defense counsel would have been 
available, and the record suggests that there was no room on the court's calendar. As of July 
2,2002, when the trial was originally set for six weeks in the future, the trial court had only 
two days available before September 13: July 31 and August 14 (R. 177: #2 at 1-2). There 
is no reason to believe that the calendar would have freed up between July 2 and July 30, 
when defendant informed the court of the disposition problem. Further, the prosecutor did 
not seek the July 31 setting in the first place due to defense counsel's schedule. The fact that 
defendant changed counsel between July 2 and July 30 does not change the fact that the 
prosecutor could not obtain the trial court's first available trial date because defense counsel 
at the time the setting was available could not make herself available for trial. See Heaton, 
958 P.2d at 917 ("extending the trial date to a reasonable time outside the disposition period 
to accommodate, in part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes 'good cause' under section 
77-29-1(3) and (4)"); Bonny, All P.2d 1 at 148 (setting the trial outside the statutory period 
to accommodate defense counsel's schedule was "entirely reasonable and practical"). 
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The State should not have to suffer the ultimate in sanctions—dismissal with prejudice 
of all charges—where the prosecutor complied with his duty under the statute to the best of 
his ability, and the only person who could have corrected the prosecutor's misperception of 
the disposition period—defendant—did not timely do so. Such a ruling would permit 
defendants to manipulate the system to their own advantage and obtain a windfall benefit 
from their deception. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's convictions and sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thiso*9 %&,




KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Titles 39 to 46 
41-la-1316. Receiving or transferring stolen motor ve-
hicle, trailer, or semitrailer — Penalty. 
It is a second degree felony for a person: 
(1) with intent to procure or pass title to a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or 
unlawfully taken to receive or transfer possession of the motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer from or to another; or 
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer 
that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken 
if he is not a peace officer engaged at the time in the performance of his 
duty. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 46, § 115; C. 1943, 
57-3a-116; L. 1989, ch. 274, § 23; C. 1963, 





REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8B 
1999 EDITION 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); or 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses 
listed in Subsections (IXa) through (f), and which may be committed by the 
actor while he is in the building. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-202, enacted by L. 
1973t ch. 196, * 76-6-202; 2001, ch. 369, $ 1; 






Titles 76 and 77 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L. 







Titles 76 and 77 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continu-
ance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for 
failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informa-
tion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commit-
ment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
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FROM: Carol Earl 
DATE: June 4, 2002 
RE: DETAINER UTAH V. Enoch Hankerson 
DAO NUMBER 02003226/GC (PH 6/26/02 1:30 BCLY. 
QMmiPS/QC (PH 6/36/QZ 1;3Q PCD and Q2QQ4Sn/<?C 
(PH 6/?6/02 1;30 PCD 
DEFENDANTS LOCATION Wall State Prison 
Please note that a "Request for Disposition" for 120 days has been 
filed in the above case. The DEMAND DATE: Mav 17. 2002 and the 
EXPIRATION DATE: September 13. 2002. please stamp this 
information on the front of the file. Copies of the Request, & 
Certificate of Inmate Status should be enclosed in the file. The 
original is stored in Criminal Procedure Team filing cabinet. 
As per to State v. Coleman, 3r P.3d 790 (Ut. a . App 2001), the 
state must object to all defense motions to continue in order to 
complete the case within the statutory 120 days or toll, any days 
attributable to the defendant's continuance(s), see §77-29-1, UCA 
and above case. 
The assigned attorney should determine whether prosecution should 
continue or whether the case should be dismissed. If a dismissal is 
made, notify Carol Earl, phone 531-4158. 
m 
j'.->, 
OL '-t* 6 > C ^ 
« * > & < * , , 
( 0 ^ ^ sM^-fakuhl p*csctl 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGE (S) 
TO: DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS 
Notice is hereby given that I. C^ fJLak* R - f r ^ o #£&*•'] (Inmate name) 
do hereby request final disposition. Charge (s) of'^Vi^" iTroyh^rrudi*- **'* & r^J*'' *~l - ° __ 
pending against me irfthe <£/.p kf& ^ ^ - j ^ Court 
brought by < Z . f)\\~ (prosecuting 
agency i.e., county, city, Attorney General, etc. in the State of Utah) and request is 
hereby made that you forward this notice to the appropriate authorities together with such 
information as required by law. 
Dated this tf day of fT .3 fit) 3^ Jit (Month/Year). 
Inmate'sNameffLi:Afcg/,-,v ^ , ^ W N USP# SqUrf 
I hereby certify that I have received a copy of the foregoing notice this CQJL) day of 
'^\\ca\ df^Yi^ (Month/Year). 
Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit 
USP, PO Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020 
* CUCF, PO Box 898, Gunnison, Utah 84634 
V.^JV* -.7 




Scott V, Carver 
Division Director 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS 
P 0 Box 250 
Draper UT 84020 
(801)576*7000 
20 May 2002 
Salt Lake County Prosecuting Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
SLC,UT 84111 
RE: ROBINSON, Martin A. AKA: HANKERSON, Enoch 
U.S.P.# 29407 DOB: 04/12/68 
YOUR CASE # 021200163-02031242 
Dear Sirs: 
MR/MRS/MS Martin A. Robinson is currently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. 
He/She is requesting disposition of untried charges of Burglary, Receive or Transfer 
Stolen Vehicle, Possession of Dangerous Weapon by Restricted Person, Possession of 
Drug Paraphernalia, Interference W/Police Officer, Burglary and any others, pending in 
your jurisdiction. Enclosed is the appropriate paperwork to process his request. 
Thank you for your assistance with this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Scott Carver, Director 
of Institutional Operations 
by: Alberta Smith 
Records/Office tech III 
End. (2) 
cc: Third District Court Clerk 
Inmate File 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
CERTIFICATE OF INMATE STATUS 
120-DAY DISPOSITION 
TO: Salt Lake County Prosecuting Attorney 
RE: ROBINSON, Martin A. AKA:HANKERSON, Enoch 29407 
Inmate Name USP# 
TERM of COMMITMENT: Theft by Receiving Stolen Property 0-5 yrs, 
Burglary 0-5 yrs, Burglary 0-5 yrs, Theft 0-5 
yrs. 
TIME SERVED: Approx 01 year(s) 02mo 
TIME REMAINING: Approx. 03 year(s) 10 mo 
**time calculated may not include toll time/credit time served** 
PAROLE ELIGIBILITY:scheduled for parole 00/00/00 ^ 
BOARD OF PARDONS Hearing set for 00/00/00 
DECISION: _ 7f> 0 0 
Mr. Scott Carver, Director 
Institutional Operations 
Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit 
Utah State Prison 
P. 0. Box 250, Draper, UT 84020 
cc: file 
Addendum E 
